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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NEWSPAPER AGENCY CORPORATION, : 
Petitioner, : Case No. 940170 
V. : 
AUDITING DIVISION, UTAH STATE : Priority No. 14 
TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This case is before the Court on a petition for review 
of a final order of the Utah State Tax Commission (Commission), 
which upheld a sales tax assessment against Newspaper Agency 
Corporation (NAC). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the case 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii) (Supp. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Did the Commission err in ruling that NAC's 
purchases of machinery and equipment for use in its new, 
$37,000,000 plant were not exempt from sales tax under a statute 
that provides an exemption for such purchases to "new or 
expanding operations . . . in any manufacturing facility in 
Utah," simply because NAC's new plant was built primarily on the 
same site as its former plant? 
An appellate court accords "the [C]ommission no 
deference concerning its conclusions of law, applying a 
correction of error standard, unless there is an explicit grant 
of discretion contained in a statute at issue before the 
appellate court." Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(1)(b) (Supp. 1994). 
Where the statute grants the Commission discretion, an appellate 
court will overturn the Commission's decision only if it is 
unreasonable. Morton International, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 
814 P.2d 581, 592 (Utah 1991). 
This issue was preserved before the Commission at 
R. 164-66. 
2. Did the Commission err in ruling that NAC's 
purchases of machinery and equipment for its new and expanded 
operation did not qualify for sales tax exemption under the 
Commission's rule that defines "new or expanding operations" as 
manufacturing activities "substantially different in nature, 
character, or purpose from prior activities"? 
An appellate court "grant[s] the [C]ommission deference 
concerning its written findings of fact, applying a substantial 
evidence standard of review." Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(1)(a) 
(Supp. 1994) . 
An appellate court accords "the [C]ommission no 
deference concerning its conclusions of law, applying a 
correction of error standard, unless there is an explicit grant 
of discretion contained in a statute at issue before the 
appellate court." Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(1) (b) (Supp. 1994). 
Where the statute grants the Commission discretion, an appellate 
court will overturn the Commission's decision only if it is 
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unreasonable. Morton International, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 
814 P.2d 581, 592 (Utah 1991). 
This issue was preserved before the Commission at 
R. 166-68. 
3. Did the Commission err in ruling that the increased 
production and capacity of NAC's new plant, above and beyond 
normal operating replacements, did not qualify NAC's purchases of 
machinery and equipment used in its new plant for sales tax 
exemption under the Commission's rule defining "normal operating 
replacements"? 
The standard of review applicable to the second issue 
also applies here. 
This issue was preserved before the Commission at 
R. 164-66. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(16) (Supp. 1989) 
(amended 1991, 1992, and 1994)x (emphasis 
added): 
The following sales and uses are exempt 
from the taxes imposed by this chapter: 
(16) sales or leases of machinery and 
equipment purchased or leased by a 
manufacturer for use in new or expanding 
1
 As noted in the Commission's decision, section 59-12-
104(16), which was in effect during the audit period, was 
renumbered as 59-12-104(15) and had its second sentence deleted 
by amendment effective July 1, 1991. See 1991 Utah Laws ch. 5, 
§ 57. The subsequent amendments were generally stylistic. 
Throughout this brief, reference will be made to section 
59-12-104(16) as the governing statute. 
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operations (excluding normal operating 
replacements, which includes replacement 
machinery and equipment even though they may 
increase plant production or capacity, as 
determined by the commission) in any 
manufacturing facility in Utah. Normal 
operating replacement shall include 
replacement machinery and equipment which 
increases plant production or capacity. . . . 
For purposes of this subsection, the 
commission shall by rule define "new or 
expanding operations" and "establishment." 
Utah Admin. Code R865-19-85S.A.3 (1994) 
(emphasis added): 
"New or expanding operations" means 
manufacturing, processing, or assembling 
activities which: 
a) are substantially different in nature, 
character, or purpose from prior activities; 
b) are begun in a new physical plant 
location in Utah; or 
c) increase production or capacity. This 
definition is subject to limitations dealing 
with normal operating replacements. 
Utah Admin. Code R865-19-85S.A.6 (1994): 
"Normal operating replacements" means 
machinery or equipment which replaces 
existing machinery or equipment of a similar 
nature, even if the use results in increased 
plant production or capacity. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NAC filed a petition for redetermination with the 
Commission after receiving a notice from the Auditing Division 
which assessed NAC sales tax, a negligence penalty, and interest 
in connection with the purchase of an offset press for a new 
plant NAC had constructed in downtown Salt Lake City. NAC 
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claimed that the purchase of the press was tax exempt because it 
was made for a "new or expanding operation" as set forth in the 
pertinent exemption provision of the Utah Code (R. 239-49) . 
Subsequently, NAC filed an amended petition for 
redetermination, which again challenged the assessment, penalty, 
and interest for the press, and also requested a refund of sales 
taxes NAC had overpaid on purchases of other machinery and 
equipment for use in its new plant (R. 197-207). The Auditing 
Division eventually amended its assessment by slightly reducing 
the amount of the tax, withdrawing the penalty, and recomputing 
interest accordingly (R. 21). The matter was then set for a 
hearing before the Commission. 
After a full evidentiary hearing, the Commission denied 
NAC's challenge to the assessment for the press and its request 
for a refund of overpaid taxes. The Commission concluded that 
NAC had not met any of the alternative tests for sales tax 
exemption under the Commission's rule defining "new or expanding 
operations" (R. 20-39). (A copy of the Commission's decision is 
contained in Appendix A to this brief.) 
NAC filed a request for reconsideration which sought 
clarification of the Commission's determination that NAC's new 
plant, built on the same site as the old plant, did not meet the 
"new physical plant location" requirement of the Commission's 
rule (R. 16-18) . The Commission denied the request for 
reconsideration (R. 7-8). 
NAC timely filed a petition for review of the 
5 
Commission's decision in this Court (R. 5-6). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
In 1952, the Kearns-Tribune Corporation and the Deseret 
News Publishing Company formed NAC. From that date, NAC has 
continuously provided printing, advertising, and circulation 
services for The Salt Lake Tribune and the Deseret News daily 
newspapers at NAC's Regent Street plant in downtown Salt Lake 
City, Utah. Providing these services was its sole business for 
many years (R. 21-22; T. 22-25) . 
NAC Decides to Build a New Plant 
In the mid-19807s, NAC decided to significantly change 
its operations by building a new plant that would enable it to 
efficiently produce modern newspapers and to compete in a variety 
of new business activities, none of which could be performed in 
the existing plant. NAC sought to improve the speed and quality 
of its newspaper printing, to compete more effectively with other 
forms of print advertising (most specifically, direct mail 
advertising), and to become a genuine competitor in the 
commercial printing market (R. 22; T. 24-25) .3 
A new plant would allow NAC to print the local editions 
of several national newspapers (such as The Wall Street Journal, 
2
 This statement of facts is based on the Commission's 
Findings of Fact (R. 20-25), as supplemented with supporting, 
uncontroverted evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing 
before the Commission (T. 20-192). 
3
 In the early 1970's, NAC occasionally did some small-scale 
commercial printing but was not competitive in the field due to 
limited capacity and inadequate quality (R. 22; T. 87-88, 163-64, 
171-72) . 
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The Los Angeles Times, and The New York Times), in addition to 
the Tribune and the Deseret News. Large-scale production of 
advertising supplements for insertion into newspapers 
("preprints"), other forms of commercial printing, and highly 
desired advertising formats called "gatefold" and "spadia" would 
be possible for the first time.4 Finally, a new plant would 
permit NAC to engage in "target marketing" or "zoning" (sending 
print advertising to discrete geographical zones within the 
newspaper circulation area), as opposed to only "mass marketing" 
(sending the same advertisement to all subscribers) (R. 22-23; T. 
47-48, 54, 179). 
Although it would be less expensive and more convenient 
to build the new plant outside the downtown Salt Lake City area, 
NAC decided to construct it primarily at the existing site on 
Regent Street. At the bottom of this decision was NAC's concern 
for the health of the downtown economy (R. 22-23; T. 26-27, 68-
69) . 
Construction of the New Plant 
Construction of the new plant began in 1988. Workers 
gutted the existing building, expanded it by approximately 25 
4
 "Preprints" are printed separately from the newspapers in 
which they appear. Comm'n Decision at 3 n.l (R. 22). They are 
printed in advance of the newspaper and then are combined with 
the newspaper either mechanically or manually (T. 67). In its 
decision, the Commission referred to "other forms of commercial 
printing" as "contract printing" (defined as "commercial printing 
unrelated to the newspaper"). Comm'n Decision at 3 n.l (R. 22). 
Advertisements in the "gatefold" and "spadia" formats 
appear in the record as Exhibits P-28 and P-29, respectively 
(T. 92) . 
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percent, and rebuilt 40 percent of the walls. They installed new 
plumbing, electrical, ventilation and cooling systems, and dust 
and ink collection systems. They also constructed a new 
foundation to support new printing presses. A new press bay, new 
mail room, and new area for central plant mechanical equipment 
were built. A two and one-half story basement was excavated to 
significantly increase capacity for the storage of newsprint. 
All new receiving and waste docks replaced their much smaller 
predecessors. The new plant also included a truck 
parking/coordination area and a building constructed on adjoining 
property purchased for the project (R. 21-23; T. 43-45, 56-57, 
162, 183) . 
NAC completely reconfigured its printing presses. This 
included the removal of two letter presses, the purchase and 
installation of two offset presses, and the reconfiguration of an 
existing offset press. The cost for these changes and the 
supporting equipment was 80 percent of the cost to outfit a new 
plant on another site (R. 23; T. 47). 
Three years and $37,000,000 later, NAC's new Regent 
Street plant was completed. The total cost of the new plant was 
95 percent of that of an entirely new building. The only 
significant saving was NAC's use of land it already owned for the 
printing plant section of the facility (R. 21, 23; T. 144, 162, 
183) . 
According to Kenneth Harding, an undisputed expert in 
newspaper production plants and the industrial architect in 
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charge of the NAC project, the Regent Street facility is now 
clearly a "new operation."5 Using illustrative charts (see 
Appendix B), Harding explained that this conclusion was the same 
whether the facility was analyzed from a production or a process 
standpoint. Moreover, in Harding's experience with 
reconstruction of newspaper facilities on existing sites, NAC's 
plant had undergone the most complicated and diverse 
reconstruction of any facility on which Harding had worked (T. 
32, 38, 52). The Auditing Division neither challenged Harding's 
qualifications as an expert nor presented any evidence to 
contradict his conclusions. 
Increased Capability and Capacity of New Plant 
The new plant increased NAC's newspaper printing 
capacity by one-fifth and its total printing capacity by two-
thirds. The new equipment allows NAC to produce advertising 
formats such as gatefold and spadia, which were not possible with 
the old equipment. The new plant's higher quality product and 
increased capacity have made NAC a legitimate competitor for 
preprint and other commercial printing jobs -- something NAC 
could not be with its old plant (R. 23; T. 80-83, 156). 
Illustrative of these significant changes are two large 
commercial printing jobs NAC completed after construction of the 
5
 Mr. Harding's company provides planning and design 
services for the newspaper industry, primarily in the United 
States. Since 1984, all of Harding's projects, except for one, 
have been newspaper facilities. He has been personally involved 
in 70 to 80 newspaper production sites throughout the country 
(T. 32). 
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new plant. In just three weeks, NAC printed 15,000,000 copies of 
a Montgomery Ward preprint for distribution in California and 
Nevada. That work was entirely independent of NAC's newspaper 
operation. Also, NAC produced a preprint for ZCMI for nine 
different newspapers in Utah and Idaho, in addition to The Salt 
Lake Tribune and the Deseret News. Prior to construction of the 
new plant, NAC could not have done either of these jobs (T. 78-
80) . 
Finally, an entirely new distribution system in the 
mail room of the new plant allows NAC to do the target marketing 
or zone advertising it previously had been unable to do (T. 47-
49) .6 
Auditing Division Assesses NAC with Additional Tax 
After examining the period in which NAC's new plant was 
constructed and the related purchases of machinery and equipment 
were made, the Commission's Auditing Division assessed NAC with 
additional sales tax of $839,609.21, plus interest. Of the tax 
imposed, $710,240.90 arose from NAC's purchases of machinery and 
equipment for the new plant (R. 21). 
NAC petitioned for redetermination, contesting all the 
tax arising from purchases of machinery and equipment for its new 
plant. NAC also requested a refund of $687,299.99, plus 
interest, for sales tax it had already paid on purchases of 
machinery and equipment for the new plant (R. 21). 
6
 A graphic illustration of the new plant's capacity 
increases is set forth in Exhibit P-38 (a copy of which is 
contained in Appendix C). 
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The Commission Denies NAC/s Petition 
At the hearing of NAC's petition for redetermination 
before the Commission, NAC presented numerous witnesses and 
documents to establish that its new plant qualified for sales tax 
exemption as a "new or expanding operation" under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-12-104(16) (Supp. 1989) and the Commission's corresponding 
rule (T. 20-192). The Auditing Division did not controvert any 
of NAC's evidence concerning the construction of its new plant or 
the increases in capacity and production that resulted from the 
new plant. 
Notwithstanding NAC's uncontroverted evidence, the 
Commission ruled that NAC's purchases of machinery and equipment 
did not qualify for sales tax exemption because the new plant did 
not fall within the Commission's definition of "new or expanding 
operations." Specifically, it concluded that the activities at 
NAC's new plant were not (1) "substantially different in nature, 
character, or purpose from prior activities," (2) "begun in a new 
physical plant location in Utah," or (3) beyond the scope of the 
Commission's definition of "normal operating replacements" (R. 
25-34) .7 
7
 For purposes of NAC's challenges to the Commission's 
findings of fact, see Points II and III, infra, this Court's 
"marshaling" rule applies: NAC "bears the burden of marshaling 
all of the evidence supporting the findings and then, despite the 
supporting facts, showing that the findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence." Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n. 858 
P.2d 1381, 1385 (Utah 1993) (footnote citation omitted). The 
foregoing statement of facts, as supplemented in the argument 
portion of this brief, marshals all the evidence that is relevant 
to the challenged findings. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court's recent decision in Sanders Brine Shrimp v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 846 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1993), reaffirmed the long-
standing principle of administrative law that an agency's rules 
must be consistent with its governing statutes. A rule that is 
out of harmony with a governing statute is invalid. Id. at 1306. 
In defiance of Sanders and the clear legislative intent, the 
Commission denied NAC sales tax exemption on purchases of 
machinery and equipment for its new, $37,000,000 plant. The 
Commission's interpretation and application of its rule defining 
"new or expanding operations" effectively eviscerated the 
statutory exemption on purchases of machinery and equipment for 
use in "new or expanding operations . . . in any manufacturing 
facility in Utah." Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-104(16) (Supp. 1989). 
The Commission's rule sets forth three disjunctive 
definitions of "new or expanding operations"; if a manufacturer 
satisfies any one of the definitions, it is entitled to the tax 
exemption. The Commission first concluded that NAC did not 
qualify for the exemption because its new plant was not built 
entirely at a "new location," as required by subsection (b) of 
the rule. Utah Admin. Code R865-19-85S.A.3(b). Denial of the 
exemption merely because NAC's new plant was built primarily on 
the site of its former plant is contrary to the plain language of 
the statute, which expressly provides the exemption for "new or 
expanding operations . . . in any manufacturing facility in 
Utah." 
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Subsection (a) of the Commission's rule allows the 
exemption for manufacturing activities that "are substantially-
different in nature, character, or purpose from prior 
activities." Utah Admin. Code R865-19-85S.A.3(a). NAC presented 
extensive, uncontradicted evidence that its new plant permitted 
NAC to engage in the following activities which had previously 
been impracticable: competitive commercial printing services, 
production of new advertising products called gatefolds and 
spadias, and zone or target marketing for advertisers. Despite 
this evidence, and the plain meaning of the statutory terms "new" 
and "expanding," the Commission unreasonably denied NAC the 
exemption. 
The Commission also unreasonably denied NAC the 
exemption on the ground that the purchases for its new plant were 
"normal operating replacements." Utah Admin. Code R865-19-
85S.A.3(c); R865-19-85S.A.6. In applying the "normal operating 
replacement" exception, the Commission contradicted the plain, 
common sense meaning of the term "normal," ignored the 
legislature's intent to provide an exemption for a "new or 
expanding operation," and failed to consider the clear weight of 
the uncontroverted evidence presented by NAC on the issue. 
In sum, through the interpretation and application of 
its rules, the Commission violated Sanders Brine Shrimp and 
erroneously denied NAC the tax exemption to which it is entitled 




THE COMMISSION ERRED IN RULING THAT NAC#S 
PURCHASES OF MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT FOR USE 
IN ITS NEW, $37,000,000 PLANT WERE NOT EXEMPT 
FROM SALES TAX UNDER A STATUTE THAT PROVIDES 
AN EXEMPTION FOR SUCH PURCHASES TO "NEW OR 
EXPANDING OPERATIONS . . . IN ANY 
MANUFACTURING FACILITY IN UTAH," MERELY 
BECAUSE NAC#S NEW PLANT WAS BUILT PRIMARILY 
ON THE SAME SITE AS ITS FORMER PLANT 
The Commission erred in deciding that, because NAC's 
new, $37,000,000 plant was built primarily on the same site as 
NAC's former plant, it is not a "new or expanding operation" for 
which NAC's related purchases of machinery and equipment would be 
exempt from sales tax under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(16) (Supp. 
1989). That decision, which rests on the Commission's rule 
defining "new or expanding operations" as manufacturing 
activities "begun at a new physical plant location in Utah," 
conflicts with the plain language and intent of section 59-12-
104(16). Thus, the Commission's denial of a sales tax exemption 
to NAC is both unreasonable and erroneous, and should be 
reversed. 
A. Standard of Review 
An appellate court "grant[s] the [C]ommission no 
deference concerning its conclusions of law, applying a 
correction of error standard, unless there is an explicit grant 
of discretion contained in the statute at issue." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-1-610(1)(b) (Supp. 1994). Where, as in the instant case, 
the statute grants the Commission discretion to define certain 
14 
statutory terms, this Court will overturn the Commission's 
decision only if it is unreasonable. Morton International, Inc. 
v. State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 592 (Utah 1991). See also 
Union Pacific R. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 876, 884 (Utah 
1992); Putvin v. State Tax Comm'n, 837 P.2d 589, 591 (Utah App. 
1992) . 
B. The Commission's Interpretation And 
Application Of Its Rule Defining "New Or 
Expanding Operations" Conflict With The 
Plain Language And Intent Of The 
Governing Statute And Therefore Are 
Unreasonable And Erroneous 
Section 59-12-104(16) provides a sales tax exemption 
for purchases of machinery and equipment by manufacturers for 
"new or expanding operations . . . in any manufacturing facility 
in Utah." That section authorizes the Commission to define by 
rule the terms "new or expanding operations," but not the terms 
"any manufacturing facility in Utah." 
The Commission promulgated the following rule: 
"New or expanding operations" means 
manufacturing, processing, or assembling 
activities which: 
a) are substantially different in nature, 
character, or purpose from prior activities; 
b) are begun in a new physical plant 
location in Utah; or 
c) increase production or capacity. This 
definition is subject to limitations dealing 
with normal operating replacements. 
Utah Admin. Code R865-19-85S.A.3 (1994). Under this rule, a 
manufacturer that satisfies any one of the three subsections is 
considered a "new or expanding operation." See Comm'n Decision 
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at 10-11 (R. 29-30). 
Below, NAC argued that its new plant satisfied 
subsection (b)'s "new plant" criteria (R. 164-66). 
Notwithstanding the overwhelming and uncontradicted evidence that 
NAC had built a completely new facility, the Commission ruled 
that NAC did not satisfy subsection (b), which the Commission 
interpreted as incorporating a "new location" test. Comm'n 
Decision at 11-12 (R. 30-31). NAC obviously had not constructed 
its new plant at an entirely new location. 
The Commission flatly rejected NAC's argument that, 
because section 59-12-104(16) grants an exemption to otherwise 
qualifying machinery and equipment used "in any manufacturing 
facility in Utah" (emphasis added), the Commission may not impose 
a "new location" requirement in defining "new or expanding 
operations." Comm'n Decision at 12 (R. 31). The Commission 
concluded its statutory authority to define "new or expanding 
operations" permitted it to impose the narrow definition. Id. 
It further opined that NAC's argument "is contrary to both the 
legislative intent underlying § 104(16) and the Commission's 
purpose in adopting the 'new location' test." Id. at 12-13 
(R. 31-32) . 
1. Subsection (b) Of The Commission's Rule 
Improperly Narrows The Availability Of The 
Exemption By Failing To Consider The Plain 
Meaning Of The Statutory Terms 
Insofar as subsection (b) of rule R865-19-85S.A.3 
limits the availability of section 59-12-104 (16)'s tax exemption 
to a new plant built on a new site (as opposed to one built on 
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the site of the old plant), it improperly narrows the 
legislature's intended exemption for "new or expanding operations 
. . . in any manufacturing facility in Utah." That the statute 
was intended to grant an exemption in both scenarios is clear 
from its plain language. See Jensen v. Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984) (the best evidence of 
the true intent and purpose of the legislature in enacting a 
statute is the plain language of the statute). 
"It is a long-standing principle of administrative law 
that an agency's rules must be consistent with its governing 
statutes. . . . Thus, a rule that is out of harmony with a 
governing statute is invalid." Sanders Brine Shrimp v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 846 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). 
Further, "[t]he terms of a statute should be interpreted in 
accord with usually accepted meanings. In construing legislative 
enactments, the reviewer assumes that each term in the statute 
was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally, 
unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable." 
Savage Indus., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 
1991) . 
Although the governing statute in this case authorizes 
the Commission to define "new or expanding operations," that does 
not permit the Commission to define those terms inconsistently 
with their plain meaning. See Union Pacific. 842 P.2d at 885 
(reversing the Commission's decision where it had discretion to 
interpret statutory terms); see generally Morton, 814 P.2d at 
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592-94 (making clear that, even though a statute may give the 
Commission discretion to define a statutory term, that discretion 
is not unlimited -- the Commission's decision may be overturned 
if it is unreasonable). "Unambiguous language in [a] statute may 
not be interpreted to contradict its plain meaning." Bonham v. 
Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989) (per curiam). 
The common definition of the term "new" includes that 
which is "different" or "tak[es] the place of the previous one." 
Webster's New World Dictionary 957 (2nd ed. 1984). To "expand" 
means "to make greater in size, bulk, scope, etc." Id. at 492. 
NAC's new plant plainly falls within these definitions. 
Further, the statute expressly provides that the tax 
exemption extends to purchases of machinery and equipment "by a 
manufacturer for use in new or expanding operations . . . in any 
manufacturing facility in Utah." § 59-12-104(16) (emphasis 
added). "Any manufacturing facility" --a phrase the legislature 
did not authorize the Commission to define -- naturally includes 
a new facility built, in whole or part, on the same site where 
the old one once stood. "The word 'any,' as it is commonly 
understood, means: ' [A]n indefinite number. One 
indiscriminately of whatever kind or quantity.'" Mt. Olympus 
Waters v. State Tax Comm'n, 877 P.2d 1271, 1273-74 (Utah App. 
1994) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 86 (5th ed. 1979)). NAC's 
new plant, therefore, is also within the scope of "any 
manufacturing facility." 
Clearly, subsection (b)'s "new location" requirement is 
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contrary to the plain meaning of "new or expanding operations . . 
. in any manufacturing facility in Utah." Therefore, the 
Commission's decision interpreting and applying that subsection 
in this case is both unreasonable and erroneous under Union 
Pacific and Sanders Brine Shrimp, which held that the Commission 
is not free to ignore common definitions of statutory terms, even 
when it is given discretion to define those terms. 
In Union Pacific, the Commission had assessed a use tax 
against Union Pacific Railroad Company on the amount paid for 
milling and drilling services on railroad ties, based on the 
Commission's interpretation of the statutory terms "repairs" and 
"renovations." "The Commission . . . classif[ied] the milling 
and drilling services as repairs or renovations." 842 P.2d at 
884. On appeal, Union Pacific argued that those services are not 
the same as repairing or renovating. Id. 
This Court held that, even though the Commission had 
discretion to interpret the terms "repairs" and "renovations," it 
could not reasonably include within them the drilling and milling 
of railroad ties. 842 P.2d at 885. The Court looked to the 
common dictionary definitions of the statutory terms in arriving 
at its conclusion. Accordingly, even under the deferential 
review standard (reasonableness), the Court reversed the 
Commission's decision requiring Union Pacific to pay the use tax. 
Id. at 886. 
Similarly, in Sanders Brine Shrimp, the Court held that 
"the Commission's rule defining [the statutory term] 
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'manufacturer' [was] invalid because it improperly restricted the 
manufacturing sales tax exemption set forth in section 59-12-
104(16)." 846 P.2d at 1306. The Commission had denied Sanders 
Brine Shrimp the sales tax exemption on purchases of equipment 
and machinery for use in the harvesting and processing of brine 
shrimp eggs. Id. at 1305. The Commission had determined that 
Sanders was not a "manufacturer" because its operation "did not 
satisfy rule R865-85S-1(A) (4)'s requirement that a 'manufacturer 
. . . produce [] a new, reconditioned, or remanufactured product, 
article, substance or commodity from raw, semi-finished, or used 
material.'" IcL. at 1305. 
The Court noted that " [n]othing in the statute requires 
the qualifying [manufacturing] facility to produce 'a new, 
reconditioned or remanufactured product, article, substance, or 
commodity.'" Id. at 1306. "Thus, under the Commission's rule, 
one might operate a manufacturing facility as defined by the 
statute and not be a manufacturer as defined by the rule." Id. 
The rule, therefore, was invalid, there being "no obvious source 
for the Commission's narrowing of the exemption's availability." 
Id. In short, the Commission, which had no discretion under the 
statute to define the term "manufacturer," was not free to 
install requirements by rule that were not contemplated by the 
statute. Id. Accordingly, under the nondeferential, correction-
of-error standard of review, the Court "reverse[d] the 
Commission's denial [of the exemption] based on noncompliance 
with its definition of 'manufacturer.'" Id. 
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Given Union Pacific and Sanders Brine Shrimp, the 
Commission could reasonably include in its definition of "new or 
expanding operations" a new plant built by a manufacturer on a 
new site. Indeed, if the Commission excluded such a plant from 
its definition, that would be patently unreasonable in light of 
the statute's plain language. It is equally unreasonable for the 
Commission to exclude from its definition a new plant built by a 
manufacturer on the site of its old plant. There is no rational 
distinction between the new plant/existing site scenario and the 
new plant/new site scenario. Neither the Commission's rule nor 
its decision offers a distinction. And, most importantly, the 
plain language of the governing statute -- "new or expanding 
operations . . . in any manufacturing facility in Utah" (emphasis 
added) -- gives rise to none. 
Moreover, the Commission's disregard of the phrase "any 
manufacturing facility" in defining "new or expanding operations" 
in subsection (b) of its rule amounts to the same error it 
committed in Mt. Olympus Waters. In that case, the Commission 
denied Mt. Olympus sales tax exemption on purchases of reusable 
bottles for some of its products. That denial was based on the 
Commission's rule limiting the sales tax exemption to purchases 
of nonreusable containers, even though the governing statute 
exempted from tax the purchase of "any container." 877 P.2d at 
1272-73 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(24) (1993)). 
On review, the Utah Court of Appeals correctly reversed 
the Commission's decision. It held that the plain language of 
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the statute exempted all containers, both reusable and 
nonreusable. The Commission's rule, which effectively read the 
word "any" out of the statutory phrase "any container," 
"impermissibly limit[ed] the container exemption to nonreusable 
containers." 877 P.2d at 1274. "The [statute] exempts 
manufacturers from paying sales tax on 'any container,' not 'any 
nonreusable container.'" Id. Thus, the rule was invalid, 
because it "impose[d] an impermissible restriction on [the 
statute]." Id. 
In sum, insofar as subsection (b) of the Commission's 
rule limits the manufacturer's sales tax exemption to a new plant 
built at a new location, it fails to incorporate common 
definitions of the statutory terms "new" and "expanding," and 
impermissibly reads the word "any" out of the statutory phrase 
"any manufacturing facility." See Union Pacific, 842 P.2d at 
885; Sanders Brine Shrimp, 846 P.2d at 1306; Mt. Olympus Waters, 
877 P.2d at 1273-74. 
The consequence of these fundamental defects is an 
unwarranted narrowing of the statutory language, which renders 
ineligible for sales tax exemption purchases of machinery and 
equipment for a new plant that a manufacturer constructs, in 
whole or part, on the site of its old plant. The rule, 
therefore, is out of harmony with the governing statute and 
improperly restricts the tax exemption intended by the 
legislature. See Sanders Brine Shrimp, 846 P.2d at 1306; Mt. 
Olvmpus Waters, 877 P.2d at 1273-74. 
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2. Subsection (b) Of The Commissions Rule 
Is Contrary To The Legislative Intent As 
Revealed By The Governing Statute's 
Legislative History 
Furthermore, if one goes beyond the plain language of 
section 59-12-104(16) and examines the statute's legislative 
history, the invalidity of subsection (b)'s "new location" 
limitation becomes even clearer. See Shurtz v. BMW of N, Am., 
Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991) (in determining legislative 
intent, the Court begins with a statute's plain language and will 
resort to other methods of statutory interpretation only if the 
language of the statute is ambiguous). 
As this Court recognized in Morton, "[t]he legislative 
history of section 59-12-104(16) suggests that the section was 
enacted to provide incentives for the expansion of manufacturing 
plants." 814 P.2d at 592 n.60. See also Dept. of Revenue v. 
Spalding Laundry and Dry Cleaning Co., 436 S.W.2d 522, 523-24 
(Ky. App. 1968) (observing that the intent of a similar exemption 
under Kentucky law was to promote new and expanded industrial 
development to improve the state's economy). The debate in the 
Utah Legislature at the time the exemption was enacted bears this 
out. 
In the House, Representative Holt stated that Utah 
needed the exemption to compete with outside industry and that 
manufacturers needed "incentives to build and expand plants." 
Utah House of Representatives, Floor Debate of H.B. 103, 46th 
Legisl., Reg. Sess., Feb. 22, 1985, Record #2. In the Senate, 
Senator Peterson observed that, without the exemption, Utah was 
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at a disadvantage in competing with other states for new or 
expanding industries. He offered the example of the Hercules 
corporation, a Utah business which was "anticipating a major 
expansion . . . that would create jobs . . . numbering into the 
thousands." Utah Senate, Floor Debate of H.B. 103, 46th Legisl., 
Reg. Sess., Feb. 26, 1985, Record #116. Hercules had indicated 
the exemption "would give them a great incentive to . . . create 
that expansion here in Utah." Id. 
When Senator Sandberg expressed concern that the 
exemption was not fair to existing manufacturers that had already 
built their plants in Utah, he was assured by a member of the 
Governor's Office of Economic Development that the exemption 
would benefit existing manufacturers desiring to expand. Id. 
In light of the foregoing, the Commission could not 
reasonably limit the availability of section 59-12-104 (16)'s 
exemption to a new plant built at a new location and exclude from 
the statute's coverage a new plant built on the site of its 
predecessor. Such a limitation conflicts directly with the 
explicit legislative intent that existing manufacturers are to 
benefit from the exemption. In enacting the exemption, the 
legislature obviously sought to encourage industrial 
modernization and growth and to stimulate Utah's economy by 
providing a tax incentive for the construction of new or expanded 
manufacturing facilities, regardless of whether such facilities 
are built at new locations. The Commission's restrictive 
application of its rule frustrates this legislative intent. 
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In fact, the Commission's decision creates precisely 
the climate the legislature sought to eliminate: one which 
discourages modernization and expansion of manufacturing 
operations by resident businesses. That Utah's economy will 
suffer if the Commission's decision is allowed to stand should 
not escape even the most casual observer. 
"Although exemptions from taxation are generally 
construed narrowly, they should, nonetheless, be construed with 
sufficient latitude to accomplish the intended purpose." Utah 
County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 725 P.2d 1357, 1359 
(Utah 1986) (citations omitted). As the Missouri Supreme Court 
said in construing a tax exemption similar to that at issue here, 
"Although the exemption is construed strictly against the 
taxpayer, that requirement should not nullify the legislative 
purpose in making the exemption available." State ex rel. Ozark 
Lead Co. v. Goldberg, 610 S.W.2d 954, 957 (Mo. 1981). It went on 
to observe: 
[0]ne object of the exemption is to stimulate 
the economy by encouraging the production of 
products which are subject to the sales tax. 
An equally important object of such exemption 
is the furtherance of industrial development 
in the state, regardless of whether the 
products involved might become subject to the 
Missouri sales tax. 
Id. (citation omitted). Those same considerations apply here. 
To summarize, the Commission's decision conflicts 
directly with the express legislative intent underlying section 
59-12-104(16). Further, the instant case is nearly identical to 
Union Pacific, Sanders Brine Shrimp, and Mt. Olympus Waters. 
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where this Court and the court of appeals held that the 
Commission's rule interpreting or applying specific statutory 
terms was inconsistent with the usual meanings of those terms and 
the plain language of the governing statute. 
Therefore, under both the deferential (reasonableness) 
and nondeferential (correction-of-error) standards of review, the 
Court should reverse outright the Commission's decision requiring 
NAC to pay sales tax on purchases of machinery and equipment for 
use in its new Regent Street plant. The evidence is overwhelming 
that NAC built a "new or expanding operation" as contemplated by 
section 59-12-104(16). The uncontroverted testimony of Kenneth 
Harding, an expert in the construction of newspaper plants, and 
the Commission's own findings of fact lead to no other reasonable 
conclusion. See Testimony of Kenneth Harding (T. 31-64) ; Comm'n 
Decision at 3-4 (R. 22-23). 
POINT II 
THE COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT NAC'S 
ACTIVITIES AFTER CONSTRUCTION OF ITS NEW 
PLANT ARE NOT SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM 
ITS PRIOR ACTIVITIES IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; ALTERNATIVELY, THE 
COMMISSION'S INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION 
OF ITS RULE ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE PLAIN 
LANGUAGE OF THE GOVERNING STATUTE 
A. The Commission's Finding That The 
Activities Of NAC's New Plant Are Not 
Substantially Different From NAC's Prior 
Activities Is Not Supported By Substantial 
Evidence 
The record lacks substantial evidence to support the 
Commission's finding that NAC's activities after construction of 
its new plant "are not substantially different from NAC's prior 
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activities." Comm'n Decision at 11 (R. 30). The evidence 
clearly established that NAC's new plant engages in a number of 
activities substantially different from its traditional, 
newspaper printing activities. These different activities 
qualify the new plant as a "new or expanding operation." § 59-
12-104 (16) . 
1. Standard of Review 
An appellate court "grant[s] the Commission deference 
concerning its written findings of fact, applying a substantial 
evidence standard of review." Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(1)(a) 
(Supp. 1994). "This Court has defined substantial evidence as 
'that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate 
to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion.7" U.S. 
West Communications, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 244 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 30, 32 (Utah 1994) (quoting Boston First Nat'1 Bank v. Salt 
Lake County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 
1990)). "The provision that there be substantial evidence to 
support a finding does not require or specify a quantity of 
evidence but requires only such relevant evidence as a reasonable 
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. at 
33 (citation and quotation omitted). 
The issue here, therefore, "is whether, based on the 
record as a whole, there was evidence before the Commission that 
reasonably supported its conclusion" that NAC's activities at the 
new plant are not substantially different from its prior 
activities. Id. 
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2• The Record Evidence 
Subsection (a) of rule R865-19-85S.A.3 defines "new or 
expanding operations" as manufacturing activities that "are 
substantially different in nature, character, or purpose from 
prior activities." Utah Admin. Code R865-19-85S.A.3(a) (1994). 
Applying this subsection, the Commission found that the 
activities in NAC's new plant "are not substantially different 
from NAC's prior activities." Comm'n Decision at 11 (R. 30). 
The Commission first acknowledged that the new 
machinery and equipment in NAC's plant improved the quality of 
the newspapers produced, gave NAC the ability to produce "special 
advertising formats such as 'gatefold' and 'spadia,'" and allowed 
NAC "to compete for 'preprint' and 'contract' printing jobs." 
Comm'n Decision at 11 (R. 30). From there, however, the 
Commission summarily concluded: 
[T]he foregoing activities are not 
substantially different from NAC's prior 
activities. Rather, they represent the 
incremental movement of the newspaper 
industry into an era where newspapers are of 
higher quality. The Commission finds NAC's 
activities along these lines to be 
evolutionary in nature and not substantially 
different from prior activities. 
Id. 
The basic flaw in this conclusion is obvious. The 
Commission expressly focused only on NAC's activities "along the 
lines" of producing "higher quality" newspapers. While those 
activities may concededly "represent the incremental movement of 
the newspaper industry into an era where newspapers are of higher 
28 
quality," NAC's production of special advertising formats, its 
zone dissemination of advertisements, and its foray into 
commercial printing clearly do not.8 The Commission's implicit 
conclusion that those activities are not substantially different 
from NAC's prior activities is unreasonable. 
NAC presented the following uncontroverted evidence to 
the Commission. The letter presses it replaced when building the 
new plant could have printed newspapers indefinitely. In fact, 
several major newspapers across the country -- e.g., The 
Washington Post and the Daily News in New York -- are still 
letter press operations. But, letter presses are incapable of 
producing the quality, color printing required in today's 
commercial printing market9 (T. 35-36, 69-70, 75-76, 79) . 
NAC's move from a letter press operation to one using 
offset presses (which are necessary for the color and quality 
demanded in commercial printing) was motivated by two desires: 
(1) to meet the dramatic changes of the industry in the 
production of newspapers themselves, and (2) to develop new 
business in the commercial printing market, such as the 
production of preprints -- work that newspaper facilities 
8
 The Commission did not realize that newspapers have two 
sets of customers: readers and advertisers. For example, spadia 
and gatefold, the specialized advertising formats, are new 
products to the advertisers, even though the reader receives the 
same final product --a newspaper. 
9
 Although letter presses, which are designed for black and 
white printing, are able to print color and were used at NAC's 
old plant to print the comics for the Sunday newspapers (T. 85-
86) , they are unable to produce commercial quality color 
printing. 
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traditionally have not done. Before the installation of the new 
offset presses and the reconfiguration of the existing one, NAC 
could not produce a commercial quality product such as a 
"preprint" with commercially acceptable speed (T. 36-37, 47, 79, 
80-83, 148-49) . 
As Kenneth Harding, the newspaper facility expert and 
architect in charge of the NAC project, testified with respect to 
NAC's press modifications: 
The primary difference is that to get into a 
nontraditional product, anything that is not 
a newspaper, they must be offset. Letter 
press is not an acceptable medium to print 
anything beyond the daily newspaper. Any 
preprint that you receive or commercial work 
must be offset in today's world. And so this 
press equipment allowed [NAC] to do those 
kinds of things. 
(T. 47). 
Further, prior to the construction of its new plant, 
NAC was incapable of producing special advertising formats like 
gatefold and spadia. The purchase and installation of new 
equipment made these possible. 
Now, NAC's new plant regularly produces advertisements 
in the gatefold and spadia formats. Preprints account for 
approximately ten percent of NAC's revenues. Commercial 
printing, which was nonexistent in 1983, is now two and one-half 
percent of NAC's revenues. Although these new activities 
represent a relatively small percentage of NAC's total revenues 
just two years after completion of the new plant, NAC's 
controller and advertising director testified that the real 
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financial benefit from the new activities would be realized in 
the next two to ten years (T. 80-83, 152, 186). 
Finally, NAC's new press system and mail room enable it 
to engage in target marketing for advertisers. Prior to 
construction of the new plant, NAC was limited to only mass 
marketing: sending the same advertisements to all subscribers in 
the newspaper circulation area (T. 47-49). 
The evidence in the instant case leads to but one 
conclusion: NAC's new plant engages in numerous activities that 
"are substantially different in nature, character, or purpose 
from prior activities." Granted, there is evidence in the record 
that may reasonably support the Commission's finding that NAC's 
newspaper printing operation, while much improved, is "not 
substantially different from prior activities." Comm'n Decision 
at 11 (R. 3 0) (emphasis added). But, there is no evidence to 
support the Commission's implicit finding that NAC's commercial 
printing activities, preprint work, production of gatefold and 
spadia advertisements, and target marketing are not substantially 
different from prior activities. 
Indeed, the evidence and the Commission's own 
subsidiary findings of fact10 dictate just the opposite 
conclusion. NAC simply did not engage in those activities in any 
significant way until after construction of its new plant. 
Therefore, the Commission's finding is not supported by 
substantial evidence. See Jensen v. State Tax Comm'n, 835 P.2d 
10
 See Comm'n Decision at 3-4 (R. 22-23). 
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965, 970 (Utah 1992) (holding that, where Commission's finding 
was "not based on a realistic evaluation of the evidence," it was 
"not supported by substantial evidence"). 
C. Insofar As The Commission's Decision 
Represents An Interpretation And Application 
Of Its Rule Which Are Inconsistent With The 
Plain Language Of The Governing Statute, The 
Decision Violates This Court's Precedent 
Alternatively, insofar as the Commission's decision 
concerning "substantially different activities" represents a 
narrow interpretation and application of the Commission's rule to 
the evidence in this case, that decision should be reversed as 
inconsistent with the plain language of the governing statute. 
See Union Pacific R. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 876, 885 
(Utah 1992). 
If the Commission interpreted subsection (a) of rule 
R865-19-85S.A.3 not to include additional, different activities 
of a manufacturer made possible by purchases of new machinery and 
equipment, that interpretation is contrary to the plain meaning 
of the statutory terms "new or expanding operations." 
Simply put, the Commission could not reasonably exclude 
additional, different activities from its definition of "new or 
expanding operations." Nor could it, therefore, reasonably 
conclude that NAC's commercial printing activities, preprint 
work, production of gatefold and spadia advertisements, and 
target marketing fail to satisfy the "new or expanding 
operations" requirement of section 59-12-104(16). All of those 
activities are substantially different from and in addition to 
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the newspaper production activities NAC engaged in before the 
construction of the new plant. The Commission's decision 
impermissibly narrows the tax exemption's availability, Sanders 
Brine Shrimp v. State Tax Comm'n, 846 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 
1993), and undermines the legislature's intent to encourage 
modernization and expansion by resident manufacturers. 
POINT III 
THE COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT NAC'S NEW 
OFFSET PRESSES AND SUPPORTING EQUIPMENT ARE 
OF THE SAME NATURE AS THE PRESSES AND 
EQUIPMENT THEY REPLACED, AND THEREFORE WERE 
"NORMAL OPERATING REPLACEMENTS , • IS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; 
ALTERNATIVELY, THE COMMISSION'S 
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF ITS RULE 
ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF 
THE GOVERNING STATUTE 
A. The Commission's Finding That The 
Machinery And Equipment NAC Purchased For Use 
In Its New Plant Were "Normal Operating 
Replacements." Is Not Supported By 
Substantial Evidence 
The Commission erred in finding that NAC's new offset 
presses and supporting equipment are of the same nature as the 
presses they replaced, and therefore were "normal operating 
replacements," which rendered NAC ineligible for section 59-12-
104(16)'s sales tax exemption. The Commission's conclusion is 
not supported by substantial evidence. 
As noted in the preceding point, the substantial 
evidence question asks "whether, based on the record as a whole, 
there was evidence before the Commission that reasonably 
supported its conclusion." U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. 
Public Serv. Comm'n, 244 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 33 (Utah 1994). 
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The Commission has defined "normal operating 
replacements" as follows: 
"Normal operating replacements" means 
machinery or equipment which replaces 
existing machinery or equipment of a similar 
nature, even if the use results in increased 
plant production or capacity. 
• • • • 
Utah Admin. Code R865-19-85S.A.6 (1994). 
The foregoing rule must be applied in a manner 
consistent with the usually accepted meanings of the statutory 
terms "normal operating replacements." See Union Pacific R. Co. 
v. State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 876, 885 (Utah 1992). For purposes 
of analyzing the Commission's decision that NAC's new presses and 
supporting equipment were "normal operating replacements," the 
key term is "normal." "Normal" means "conforming with or 
constituting an accepted standard, model, or pattern; esp., 
corresponding to the median or average of a large group in type, 
appearance, achievement, function, development, etc." Webster's 
New World Dictionary 970 (1984). Under the Union Pacific 
standard, the phrase "of a similar nature," contained in rule 
R865-19-85S.A. 6, must be interpreted and applied in harmony with 
this usually accepted meaning of "normal." 
The Commission made the following finding as to whether 
NAC's new presses and supporting equipment were "normal operating 
replacements": 
NAC's new offset presses and auxiliary 
equipment were placed in a plant that had 
previously consisted of an offset press and 
two letter presses. While the new offset 
presses and supporting equipment offer 
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superior quality and greater capacity than 
the old letter presses, the basic purpose and 
actual use of both types of presses is the 
same: they produce daily newspapers. The 
Commission therefore concludes that NAC's new 
machinery and equipment is similar in nature 
to its old equipment and fails to meet the 
third alternative test of Rule R85.S.A.3. 
Comm'n Decision at 14 (R. 33). 
This finding ignores the uncontroverted evidence that 
NAC's new plant, with its new machinery and equipment, is an 
entirely new system. The dramatic increases in capacity and 
production are fully summarized above. Although it is true that 
the new machinery and equipment do what their predecessors did, 
i.e., produce daily newspapers, they do much more. The new 
machinery and equipment not only produce modern newspapers, but 
also commercial printing, preprints, and advertisements in 
special formats. In short, the replacements possess capabilities 
their predecessors did not. 
Thus, on this record, the Commission could not 
reasonably conclude that the machinery and equipment NAC 
purchased for its new plant were "normal operating replacements." 
To maintain its existing newspaper operation, NAC was not 
required to replace its letter presses. Those presses were in 
good working order and could have continued to print newspapers 
indefinitely. As the dissenting member of the Commission 
correctly stated: 
NAC has established by uncontroverted 
testimony and evidence that the expenditures 
in question do not constitute "normal 
operating replacements." The demonstrated 
increases in production, capacity and 
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capability, noted in paragraphs 15 and 16 of 
the majority decision's findings of fact, 
exceed those that would be an incidental and 
anticipated result of replacing equipment 
that is obsolete and/or worn out. 
Comm'n Decision at 19-20 (R. 38-39) (Shearer, Comm., dissenting). 
To conclude that NAC's purchases were "normal operating 
replacements" is as unreasonable as concluding that the 
replacement of a perfectly working typewriter with a state-of-
the-art computer and laser printer, so that desktop publishing 
could for the first time be offered by a business, constitutes a 
"normal operating replacement." Admittedly, the capabilities of 
a typewriter and a computer/printer overlap to a certain degree 
(e.g., both are used to type letters, to address envelopes, 
etc.). But, a business that desires only to maintain its 
operation at the current level of production and capacity -- for 
which a single, functioning typewriter is entirely satisfactory 
-- normally is not going to replace the typewriter with an 
expensive computer/printer. Yet, this is precisely what the 
Commission concluded with respect to NAC's purchases of offset 
presses and supporting equipment (the "state-of-the-art 
computer/printer") as replacements for the letter presses (the 
"typewriter"). 
In sum, the record evidence does not support the 
Commission's myopic view that the new offset presses and 
supporting equipment serve only to "produce daily newspapers" and 
therefore merely "replace [d] existing machinery or equipment of a 
similar nature." See R865-19-85S.A.6. Consequently, its 
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conclusion that this machinery and equipment constitute only 
"normal operating replacements," and that NAC's new plant is 
therefore not a "new or expanding operation," is unreasonable and 
should be reversed. See U.S. West, 244 Utah Adv. Rep. at 33; 
Jensen v. State Tax Comm'n, 835 P.2d 965, 970 (Utah 1992) 
(reversing Commission's finding because it was "not supported by 
substantial evidence"). 
B. Insofar As The Commission's Decision 
Represents An Interpretation And Application 
Of Its Rule Which Are Inconsistent With The 
Plain Language Of The Governing Statute. The 
Decision Violates This Courts Precedent 
Alternatively, insofar as the Commission's decision 
represents an unusually broad interpretation and application of 
the statutory terms "normal operating replacements," it should be 
reversed as inconsistent with the plain meaning of "normal." See 
Union Pacific, 842 P.2d at 885. 
The Commission may not define "normal" so broadly that 
the phrase "normal operating replacements" encompasses 
replacement machinery and equipment with capabilities 
significantly superior to those of their predecessors. Such 
machinery and equipment are not "the median or average of a large 
group in type, appearance, achievement, [or] function," Webster7 s 
New World Dictionary 970 (1984), when compared with the old 
machinery and equipment. 
The Commission's broad definition of "normal" 
effectively reads that word, as it is usually understood, out of 
the governing statute. The result is that every operating 
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replacement becomes a "normal operating replacement." This 
permits the unacceptable conclusion, discussed above, that 
replacement of a typewriter with a state-of-the-art 
computer/printer constitutes a "normal operating replacement." 
In short, the Commission's unjustifiably broad 
interpretation and application of subsection (c)'s "normal 
operating replacement" exception are contrary to the common 
meaning of the key statutory term "normal." This violates Union 
Pacific and Sanders Brine Shrimp v. State Tax Comm'n, 846 P.2d 
1304 (Utah 1993)X1, and, again, the legislature's intent to 
foster industrial and economic growth in Utah is frustrated. Cf. 
Matter of Fasi. 634 P.2d 98, 103 (Hawaii 1981) (holding that an 
exception to a tax exemption should be narrowly construed in 
favor of the taxpayer where there is any ambiguity in the 
statutory language). Quite simply, second-guessing the 
legislature is not the prerogative of the Commission or any other 
administrative agency. 
11
 Significantly, at the hearing before the Commission, the 
Auditing Division argued that Sanders Brine Shrimp was "not even 
applicable to the case at hand" (T. 238). Ignoring the general 
principles of administrative law set forth in the case, the 
Auditing Division considered Sanders "irrelevant" merely because 
the definition of "manufacturer" was at issue there, as opposed 
to the definition of "normal operating replacements." 
These arguments may well have led the Commission to the 
erroneous conclusion that it was free to define "normal operating 
replacements" in any manner it pleased. As noted earlier, 
Sanders reaffirmed the long-standing principle that an 
administrative agency's rules must be in harmony with the 
governing statutes. And, this principle applies even when the 
Commission has discretion to define statutory terms. Union 
Pacific, 842 P.2d at 885. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
reverse the Commission's decision denying NAC sales tax exemption 
on purchases of machinery and equipment for use in its new 
plant. Although NAC was required to meet only one of the 
Commission's definitions of "new or expanding operations" to 
qualify for the exemption, it actually met all three, as those 
definitions must be construed under the plain language of the 
governing statute. At bottom, NAC's new plant satisfies the 
statutory requirement of a "new or expanding operation [] . . . in 
any manufacturing facility in Utah"; therefore, NAC is entitled 
to section 59-12-104(16)'s sales tax exemption. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 3/ day of October, 1994. 
^SavtsJL KO% M W ^ ^ w 
DAVID B. THOMPSON 
Tesch, Thompson & 
Sonnenreich, L.C. 
SHARON E. SONNENREICH 
General Counsel for NAC 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
NEWSPAPER AGENCY CORPORATION, ) 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND FINAL DECISION 
Appeal No. 92-0328 
Account No. 01146 
Tax Type: Sales & Use 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This appeal came before the Utah State Tax Commission for 
a formal hearing on July 14 and 15, 1993. Val Oveson, Chairman of 
the Commission, Joe Pacheco and Alice Shearer, Commissioners, and 
Alan Hennebold, Administrative Law Judge, heard the matter on 
behalf of the Commission. 
Petitioner Newspaper Agency Corporation ("NAC" hereafter) 
was represented by attorneys William B. Bohling and Bruce E. 
Babcock, of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, and Sharon 
Sonnenreich, NAC's General Counsel. Respondent Auditing Division 
("the Division") was represented by Gale Francis, Assistant Utah 
Attorney General. 
Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the Tax 
Commission hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The tax in question is sales and use tax. 
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2. The period in question is July 1, 1988 through June 
30, 1991. 
3. On December 24, 1991, the Division assessed NAC with 
additional sales and use tax of $919,314.49, penalty of $91,931.45, 
and interest at the statutory rate of 12% per annum. On March 15, 
1993, the Division amended its assessment by reducing the amount of 
tax to $839,609.21, withdrawing the penalty assessment, and 
recomputing interest accordingly. 
4. Of the $839,609.21 in tax imposed by the amended 
assessment, $710,240.90 arises from NAC's purchase of machinery and 
equipment for re-equipping its newspaper production plant located 
at Regent Street in downtown Salt Lake City. The Division 
describes the balance of the tax, $129,368.31, as arising from 
NAC's payments for repairs to its equipment. 
5. NAC filed a timely appeal contesting all of the tax 
arising from purchases of machinery and equipment and a portion of 
the tax on repairs. NAC also requested a refund of $687,299.99, 
plus interest, for tax it had already paid on purchases of 
machinery and equipment for the Regent Street plant. 
6. Incidental to the main points of its appeal, NAC also 
seeks refund of sales tax paid on natural gas used at its Gale 
Street plant. 
7. NAC was formed in 1952 by the Kearns- Tribune 
Corporation and the Deseret News Publishing Corporation. It 
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provides printing, advertising and circulation services for both 
newspapers from the Regent Street plant. 
8. During the mid-1980's, NAC decided to modernize its 
printing plant. The decision was prompted by two motives: First, 
modernization would permit faster and higher quality printing of 
the Salt Lake Tribune and Deseret News. Second, it would allow NAC 
to print local editions of national newspapers, advertising 
supplements ("preprints"), and other contract printing.1 
9. NAC had occasionally done contract printing in the 
past, but was not competitive in that field due to limited capacity 
and inadequate quality. 
10. Having decided to modernize, NAC faced another 
decision: Whether to reconstruct the Regent Street plant or build 
a new plant somewhere else. NAC chose to reconstruct its Regent 
Street plant in order to maintain its presence in the city center 
and contribute to the economic health of the downtown area. 
11. NAC reconstructed and re-equipped the Regent Street 
plant during the audit period. The existing building was expanded 
by approximately 25% on property already owned by NAC. Forty 
percent of the building's walls were rebuilt. A new foundation was 
built to support new printing presses. New plumbing, electrical, 
1
 "Preprints" are advertising supplements that are printed 
separately from the newspapers in which they appear. "Contract 
printing" is commercial printing unrelated to the newspaper. 
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ventilation, and cooling systems, as well as dust and ink 
collection systems, were installed. 
12. NAC also purchased additional adjacent land for 
loading docks and truck parking. 
13. NAC's cost to reconstruct its plant was 95% of what 
an entirely new building would have cost. The only significant 
saving was NAC's ability to use land which it already owned. 
14. Before reconstruction, the Regent Street plant 
contained two letter presses and one offset press. The letter 
presses were removed from service, the existing offset press was 
reconfigured, and two new offset presses with supporting machinery 
and equipment were added. The cost of equipment for the Regent 
Street plant was 80% of the cost to equip a new plant. 
15. Reconstruction of the Regent Street plant increased 
NAC's newspaper printing capacity by 2o% and its total printing 
capacity by two-thirds. 
16. In addition to increased capacity, new equipment at 
the Regent Street plant allowed NAC to produce advertising formats 
such as "gatefold" and "spadia" that had not been technically 
possible before. 
17. As a result of NAC's improved quality and increased 
capacity, it is able to compete for preprint and contract printing. 
18. With respect to assessment of sales tax on repairs, 
NAC challenges the tax on the following items: 
-4-
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a. $7,237.92, paid to Rockwell International for 
consulting and repair on NAC's 1978 offset press. 
b. $807.05 paid to Collier-Jackson. 
c. $2,906 paid to Fincor for press motor repair. 
d. $4,352.33 paid to Harvey Hrcho for service to press. 
e. $4,496.16 paid to Rockwell International for repair 
of a "folder". 
f. $2,516.58 paid to Ryco for service to the dampening 
system. 
g. $8,700 paid to Unison for service to transformers at 
the Regent Street site. 
h. Payment of $10,681.25 as partial payment for a 
humidification system for the Regent Street project. 
i. $31,810 paid to Ryco as 50% of the amount due on a 
dampening system for one of NAC's new presses. 
j. An additional $31,810 paid to Ryco as 50% of the 
amount due on a dampening system for one of NAC#s new presses. 
k. $22,808.50 paid to Mirachem for "spare parts, etc". 
19. During the audit period, NAC paid sales tax on 
natural gas purchased from Mountain Fuel Company and used at its 
Gale Street plant. 
20. The Commission originally scheduled this matter for 
hearing on October 5, 1992. The Audit Division requested that the 
hearing date be vacated to allow further discovery. The Commission 
-5-
(tftftn.inn A 
Appeal No, 92-0328 
rescheduled the hearing for November 30, 1992. NAC then asked for 
a continuance for two reasons: First, to allow review of a 
proposed amended audit and the Commission's decision on NAC's 
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment; and second, to allow NAC to 
decide whether it would pay the assessed tax under protest and then 
file an action to recover the tax in the district court. NAC 
ultimately decided to forego the district court proceeding, but did 
not advise the Commission of its decision until early 1993. The 
Commission suggested that the hearing be scheduled during May, 
1993. The parties were unable to accommodate that hearing date and 
instead chose July 13, 1993. The hearing was actually held on July 
14, 1993. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Section 103(1) of Utah's Sales and Use Tax Act (Utah Code 
Ann. §59-12-101 et seq.) levies a tax on the purchaser for the 
amount paid or charged for the following: 
(a) retail sales of tangible personal property 
made within the state; 
(c) gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or 
other fuels sold or furnished for commercial 
consumption; 
. . . 
(g) services for repairs or renovations of 
tangible personal property or services to 
install tangible personal property in 
connection with other tangible personal 
property; 
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Section 104 of the Act, in effect during the audit 
period2, exempts the following sales and uses from tax: 
(16) Sales or leases of machinery and 
equipment purchased or leased by a 
manufacturer for use in new or expanding 
operations (excluding normal operating 
replacements, which includes replacement 
machinery and equipment even though they may 
increase plant production or capacity, as 
determined by the commission) in any 
manufacturing facility in Utah. Normal 
operating replacement shall include 
replacement machinery and equipment which 
increases plant production or capacity. . . . 
For purposes of this subsection, the 
commission shall by rule define "new or 
expanding operations". . . 
Section 104(16) authorizes the Commission to define the 
term "new or expanding operations". In Administrative Rule R865-
19-85S.A.3., the Commission has defined the term as follows: 
"New or expanding operations" means 
manufacturing, processing, or assembling 
activities which: 
a) are substantially different in nature, 
character, or purpose from prior activities; 
b) are begun in a new physical plant location 
in Utah; or 
c) increase production or capacity. This 
definition is subject to limitations dealing 
with normal operating replacements. 
2
 Section 104(16) was renumbered as (15) and the second 
sentence was deleted by amendment effective July 1, 1991. 
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Section 104(16) also authorizes the Commission to define 
the term "normal operating replacements". Rule R865-19-85S.A.6. 
defines "normal operating replacements" as: 
[M]achinery or equipment which replaces 
existing machinery or equipment of a similar 
nature, even if the use results in increased 
plant production or capacity. 
a) If new machinery or equipment is purchased 
or leased which has the same or similar 
purpose as machinery or equipment retired from 
service within 12 months before or after the 
purchase date, such machinery or equipment is 
considered as replacement and is not exempt. 
b) If existing machinery or equipment is kept 
for back-up or infrequent use; new, similar 
machinery or equipment purchased would be 
considered as replacement and is not exempt. 
The Commission's Rule R865-19-85S.B.1. further defines 
the proper application of §104 (16)'s exemption for manufacturing 
equipment, as follows: 
The machinery and equipment exemption applies 
only to tangible personal property. It does 
not apply to real property or to tangible 
personal property which is purchased and 
becomes an improvement to real property. The 
exemption does not apply to charges for labor 
to repair, renovate, or clean machinery or 
equipment. 
The Commission has also adopted Rule R865-19-51S.C., 
pertaining to assessment of sales tax on charges for labor used in 
the installation or repair of tangible personal property, as 
follows: 
Charges for labor to install personal property 
in connection with other personal property are 
-8-
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taxable (see Rule R865-19-78S) whether 
material is furnished by seller or not. 
The "tax imposing11 provisions of Utah's Sales and Use Tax 
Act are construed in favor of the taxpayer. The exemption 
provisions of the Act are strictly construed. Parsons Asphalt 
Products v. State Tax Commission. 617 P.2d 397, 398 (Utah 1980). 
For reasonable cause, the Commission may waive, reduce, 
or compromise any assessment of penalty or interest. (Utah Code 
Ann. §59-1-401(8).) 
DECISION AND ORDER 
The sales tax which NAC appeals comes from three distinct 
categories of transactions. The first is NAC's purchase of 
machinery and equipment for its Regent Street facility. The second 
is NAC's purchases of miscellaneous equipment and repairs. The 
third, and by far the smallest, is NAC's purchase of natural gas 
for use at its Gale Street plant. In addition to the foregoing 
categories, NAC asks the Commission to waive interest which has 




Appeal No. 92-0328 
I. Purchases of Machinery and Equipment for Regent Street Plant 
NAC acknowledges that its purchases of machinery and 
equipment fall within the terms of §103 of the Sales and Use Tax 
Act and are subject to sales tax unless specifically exempted by 
some other provision of the Act. NAC relies upon §104(16) for 
that purpose. Because NAC is seeking an exemption from tax, it 
must show that it falls squarely within the terms of §104(16). 
Section 104(16) establishes four conditions for exemption 
from tax: (1) The items must be machinery or equipment; (2) they 
must be purchased by a manufacturer; (3) they must be used in a 
manufacturing facility in Utah; and (4) they must be used in a new 
or expanding operation. The parties have stipulated, and the 
Commission agrees, that NAC meets the first three of the foregoing 
conditions. The only question that remains is whether the subject 
machinery and equipment are used in a "new or expanding" operation. 
The Commission has specific statutory authority to define 
the term "new or expanding operation".3 The Commission's 
definition is found in Rule R865-19-85S.A.3., which limits "new or 
expanding" operations to those which are: 
(1) substantially different in nature, character, or 
purpose from prior activities; 
Utah Code Ann. § 5 9 - 1 2 - 1 0 4 ( 1 5 ) . 
- 1 0 -
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(2) begun in a new physical plant location in Utah; or 
(3) increase production or capacity, subject to the 
Commission's definition of "normal operating replacements". If NAC 
satisfies any one of the foregoing conditions, it meets the 
requirement of a "new or expanding operation". 
Rule R85S.A.3.'s first criterion is that the machinery 
and equipment be used in activities that are substantially 
different in nature, character, or purpose from prior activities. 
NAC points to the improvement in newspaper quality that results 
from its new equipment. NAC also points to the equipment's ability 
to produce special advertising formats such as "gatefold" and 
"spadia". NAC further points to its ability, resulting from the 
new machinery and equipment, to compete for "preprint" and 
"contract" printing jobs. 
In the Commission's view, the foregoing activities are 
not substantially different from NAC's prior activities. Rather, 
they represent the incremental movement of the newspaper industry 
into an era where newspapers are of higher quality. The Commission 
finds NAC's activities along these lines to be evolutionary in 
nature and not substantially different from prior activities. 
Rule R85S.A.3.'s second criterion for a "new or expanding 
operation" is that the machinery or equipment be used at "a new 
physical plant location in Utah". The term "location" is commonly 
defined as "a tract of land designated for a purpose". (Webster's 
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New Collegiate Dictionary). As previously noted, tax exemption 
provisions must be construed strictly against the exemption. In 
view of the plain language of Rule R85S.A.3 and the well-settled 
standards for construction of exemption provisions, the Commission 
concludes that NAC did not use the machinery and equipment in 
question at a new location. 
NAC argues that the requirement of a "new location" in 
the foregoing test improperly restricts the scope of the statutory 
exemption. In particular, NAC argues that since §104(16) grants an 
exemption to otherwise qualifying machinery and equipment used in 
any manufacturing facility in Utah, the Commission may not use "new 
location" as a test to determine whether an enterprise is a "new 
and expanding operation". 
The Commission is not persuaded by NAC's argument. The 
Commission has specific authority under §104(16) to define "new and 
expanding operation". The Commission exercised that authority by 
including a "new location" test as one of several alternatives 
tests. If as claimed by NAC, the "new location" test is in error 
and is therefore omitted, NAC's claim to exemption must be judged 
by the two remaining tests set forth in Rule R85S.A.3. NAC would 
be in no stronger position than it is now. Consequently, the only 
way for NAC to benefit from its attack on the "new location" test 
is if the test is selectively rewritten by removing the word 
"location", but leaving the remainder of the test intact. Such a 
-12-
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transformation of the rule is contrary to both the legislative 
intent underlying §104(16) and the Commission's purpose in adopting 
the "new location" test. 
While the location test as it now exists must be applied 
to this appeal, this proceeding raises the question of whether the 
"location" test goes beyond the intent of §103(16). If the 
location test is too broad, the argument goes, it should be removed 
from Rule R85S.A.3. The Commission expresses no view on that 
issue. Any possible changes must be reserved for future rulemaking 
and are not material to this appeal. 
The Commission recognizes that NAC chose to remain at 
Regent Street for the most laudable civic motives. NAC's decision 
is undoubtedly a significant benefit to Salt Lake City. However, 
§103(16) 's exemption from sales tax does not turn upon a taxpayer's 
motives, however lofty. In summary, because the machinery and 
equipment in question were used at the same location as NAC's 
existing plant, NAC does not meet the second of Rule R85S.A.3.'s 
tests for "new and expanding operations". 
Rule R85S.A.3.'s third and final alternative test for 
"new and expanding operation" recognizes machinery and equipment 
used to "increase production or capacity, subject to limitations 
dealing with normal operating replacements". Pursuant to statutory 
authorization, the Commission has defined "normal operating 
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replacements",4 In substance, machinery and equipment that expands 
capacity satisfies the "new and expanding operation", requirement 
only if the machinery and equipment does not replace existing 
machinery or equipment of a similar nature. 
NAC's new offset presses and auxiliary equipment were 
placed in a plant that had previously consisted of an offset press 
and two letter presses. While the new offset presses and 
supporting equipment offer superior quality and greater capacity 
than the old letter presses, the basic purpose and actual use of 
both types of presses is the same: they produce daily newspapers. 
The Commission therefore concludes that NAC's new machinery and 
equipment is similar in nature to its old equipment and fails to 
meet the third alternative test of Rule R85S.A.3. for "new or 
expanding operation". 
Based on the foregoing, the Commission concludes that 
NAC's purchases of machinery and equipment for its Regent Street 
plant fail to meet any one of Rule 85S.A.3.'s three definitions of 
a "new or expanding operation" and therefore do not qualify for 
exemption from sales tax under §104(16). 
As a final point, NAC cannot argue that it misunderstood 
the application of the Sales Tax Act to the Regent Street project. 
4
 Rule R865-19-85S.A.6, defining "normal operating 
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The terms of §104(16) and the applicable regulations were in effect 
before NAC started the project. At that time, NAC believed its 
purchases of machinery and equipment were taxable, as evidenced by 
the fact that NAC paid the tax for the first part of audit period. 
It is clear that NAC undertook the Regent Street project with full 
knowledge of the sales tax consequences of the project. 
II. Tax on Charges for Repair 
The second part of NAC's appeal pertains to the 
assessment of tax on what the Division describes as "charges for 
repairs". Although many separate items were included in this 
portion of the Division's audit, NAC has presented evidence 
challenging the taxability of only 11 individual items. 
Of the 11 items in dispute, the following 7 items can be 
categorized as charges for services to install or service machinery 
or equipment: 
a. $7,237.92, to Rockwell International for consulting 
and repair on NAC's 1978 offset press; 
b. $807.05 to Collier-Jackson; 
c. $2,906 to Fincor for press motor repair; 
d. $4,352.33 to Harvey Hrcho for service to press; 
e. $4,496.16 to Rockwell International for repair of a 
"folder"; 
f. $2,516.58 to Ryco for service to the dampening 
system; and 
• 1 5 -
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g. $8,700 to Unison for service to transformers at the 
Regents Street site. 
Section 103(1)(g) of the Sales and Use Tax Act levies a 
tax on the amount paid for repairs, renovations or installation of 
tangible personal property in connection with other tangible 
personal property. NAC argues that the foregoing tax does not 
apply to the 7 items listed above because such items represent 
services to real property, not personal property. However, the 
evidence establishes that the property which was serviced or 
repaired was severable from the underlying real property. Such 
property therefore retains its character as personal property. The 
Commission therefore concludes that charges for services to such 
personal property are subject to sales tax. 
Three of the items contested by NAC are charges for the 
purchase of machinery or equipment installed at the Regent Street 
plant: 
h. $10,681.25 for a humidification system; 
i. $31,810 as part payment for dampening system; and 
j. an additional $31,810 for the dampening system. 
Because the foregoing three items are purchases of equipment for 
the Regent Street plant, the Commission finds such items to be 
subject to tax for the same reasons as discussed under Point I of 
this decision, above. 
-16-
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The final individual item contested by NAC (item k) is 
$22,808,50 paid to Mirachem for "spare parts, etc". Section 
103(1) (a) of the Act specifically taxes retail sales of tangible 
personal property made within the state. NAC has failed to 
establish that its Mirachem transaction falls within any of the 
exemption provisions of the Act. The transaction is therefore 
taxable. 
III. Purchase of Gas from Mountain Fuel Supply Co. 
During the audit period, NAC purchased natural gas from 
Mountain Fuel Supply for use at its Gale Street plant. Mountain 
Fuel collected sales tax from NAC on such purchases. 
At the hearing in this matter, NAC asked the Commission 
to grant a refund of the tax paid with respect to such natural gas, 
on the grounds the gas was not used for "commercial" purposes and 
is therefore not subject to tax under the Sales And Use Tax Act. 
The Division does not argue that NAC was liable for the tax, but 
argues that the tax on gas is not a part of the Division's audit, 
which is the subject matter of this proceeding. The Division 
further argues that NAC should follow established procedures by 
filing a refund claim with Mountain Fuel. 
Given that NAC's sales tax liability for the audit period 
is at issue, the Commission sees no substantial reason to refrain 
from granting NAC a refund for improperly paid sales tax on gas 
purchases during the audit period. 
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IV. Interest 
The Commission is given discretion by Utah Code Ann. §59-
1-401 to waive interest "for reasonable cause". NAC argues that 
interest should be partially waived in this case because of the 
Division's failure to promptly attend to discovery, resulting in a 
delay of the hearing for several months. NAC could have avoided 
interest charges by paying the tax, subject to the outcome of this 
appeal. While it is true that the Auditing Division delayed the 
hearing from early October 1992 until late November 1992, it is 
also true that thereafter, NAC failed to notify the Commission of 
its intention to proceed. Also, scheduling difficulties with both 
parties caused additional delay. In the Commission's view, the 
foregoing circumstances do not constitute reasonable cause to abate 
the interest assessed in this matter. 
Summary 
The Commission finds that NAC's purchases of machinery 
and equipment for the Regent Street plant are not exempt from sales 
tax under §59-12-104(16) of Utah's Sales and Use Tax Act, and are 
subject to sales tax pursuant to §59-12-103 of the Act. Those 
items identified in Part II of this decision are likewise subject 
to tax pursuant to §59-12-103 of the Act. NAC is granted a refund 
of sales tax paid on gas purchases during the audit period. NAC's 
request for waiver of interest is denied. The Auditing Division 
-18-
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will issue an amended audit in conformity with this decision, 
is so ordered. 
DATED this ^ 7 day of X L v ^ > < ^ ^ - 1993. 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
It 
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After hearing the testimony in this appeal, having 
examined all the exhibits and the written submittals from both 
parties and having deliberated upon them as well as other cases 
concerning this statute (Utah Code Ann. §59-12-104(16)) I conclude 
that: 
1) NAC has established by uncontroverted testimony and 
evidence that the expenditures in question do not constitute 
"normal operating replacements". The demonstrated increases in 
production, capacity and capability, noted in paragraphs 15 and 16 
of the majority decision's findings of fact, exceed those that 
-19-
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would be an incidental and anticipated result of replacing 
equipment that is obsolete and/or worn out. 





NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of the final 
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days 
after the date of final order to file in Supreme Court a petition 
for judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §§63-46b-13(1), 63-46b-
14(3) (a). ^ 
AH&92-0326** :<z ft 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Decision to the following: 
Newspaper Agency Corporation 
c^o T»iYlaam "B. 'atihYmg 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
170 South Main, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Craig Sandberg 
Deputy Director, Auditing 
Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
Kim Thorne 
Director, Auditing Division 
Heber M. Wells Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
Gale Francis 
Assistant Attorney General 
50 South Main, #900 
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NAC PRODUCTION OUTPUT COMPARISION 
Old Equipment V.S. New Equipment 
ExU.t P-3J 
